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Abstract 
 
This paper provides additional insights on the relationship between government size and trade 
openness using a panel of countries drawn from the World Development Indicators and the 
Penn World Tables 7.0 from 1962 to 2009. It is shown that the compensation hypothesis 
proposed by Rodrik (1998) and revisited by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) and by Ram (2009) 
cannot be attributed general validity. Rather, it may be driven by specific geographical areas. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A body of influential research has suggested that there is a positive association between trade 
openness and government size. Cameron (1978), one of the first to establish econometric 
evidence on the topic, noted that trade openness in 1960 was a strong predictor of the 
increase in government tax revenues between 1960 and 1975. He pointed out that more open 
countries tend to be more unionised, with collective bargaining leading to greater demand for 
social protection accommodated by increasing tax revenues. This pioneering version of the 
compensation hypothesis – by which more open countries tend to have bigger public sectors – 
was reappraised and further articulated by Rodrik (1998). While challenging the collective 
bargaining explanation, Rodrik argued that government spending might serve as an indirect 
insurance against external (and undiversified) risk. His most influential result was to find a 
positive association between government consumption and trade integration in a large sample 
of countries, that qualifies openness both as a determinant and as a predictor of government 
consumption levels across countries (Rodrik, 1998; 1004).1 This conclusion would suggest a 
strong complementarity between markets and governments, with a more powerful role for 
government consumption in those economies that are subject to larger external risks. 
In an influential work, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) (henceforth AW) have challenged the 
Rodrik’s hypothesis, by arguing that the positive relation between openness and government 
size could be mediated by country size. The first reason is that country size is negatively 
correlated to government size, as the costs of certain (non-rival) public goods grow less than 
proportionally to the size of population. This is typical, for example, of infrastructures, roads, 
libraries (at least up to the congestion limit) and implies that the per capita cost of public 
goods declines in larger countries. The second reason is that country size is also negatively 
correlated to trade openness, as small countries have less opportunities for autarky. As argued 
by AW (p. 306), these two facts taken together imply that more open countries may have 
bigger governments.  
This has cast some doubts on the existence of a Rodrik-type direct link between openness 
and government size. Consistently with the two hypotheses, AW – by running OLS on 1980-
84 averages for the same set of countries used by Rodrik (1998) – actually find a negative 
relation between government consumption and population (taken as a proxy of country size) 
and a negative relation between trade openness and population. In both cases, the log of 
population exhibits a highly significant negative coefficient, and the result appears robust not 
only to a parsimonious specification of explanatory variables, but also to an extension of the 
basic model to control for possibly omitted variables. 
Then, in order to capture the impact of country size on the co-variation between 
government consumption and trade openness, the authors move to the estimation of the basic 
Rodrik’s specification, where “country size” is not included among the explanatory variables 
(as in table 1 in Rodrik, 1998) and replicate the Rodrik’s result of a positive association 
between government consumption and trade openness. By omitting trade openness and 
including country size the negative relation between country size and population is also 
confirmed. When including both (trade openness and country size), the positive impact of 
trade openness persists, that confirms the Rodrik’s result. However, AW impute this 
persistence to the high degree of collinearity between openness and country size. Thus, they 
experiment a version of the regression where variables calculated as ratios are included in 
levels and not in logs. In this case, the positive relation between openness and government 
                                                 
1 In Rodrik (1998), a measure of the risk involved in higher economic integration was taken as the product between volatility 
of terms-of-trade and trade openness. 
 3 
consumption disappears, showing that the original Rodrik’s result might be driven by the 
omission of country size.2  
More recently, Ram (2009) (henceforth R) has challenged the outcome of AW mainly on 
the econometric ground. Considering 154 countries for the period 1960-2000, R shows that 
while pooled OLS regressions replicate the results of AW, a fixed effect estimation that takes 
into account cross-country heterogeneity would not lead to a significant negative co-variation 
of country size and either trade openness or government size (p. 213). Thus, the estimates by 
R are totally consistent with a direct link between openness and government size along the 
lines suggested by Rodrik (1998), and are not mediated by country size as argued by AW. In 
R, the compensation hypothesis would indeed be supported by the positive sign of trade in all 
specifications. 
This paper sheds additional light on these issues. In particular, it will compare the results 
by AW and R with those obtained by an updated panel analysis in the period 1962-2009, with 
data taken from the Penn World Tables 7.0 (PWT) and from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). We show that the sign of the relationship between government size and 
economic openness is not necessarily driven by country size. More importantly, the results 
obtained by fixed effects as in Ram (2009) show that the compensation hypothesis strictly 
depends on the inclusion of African countries, further weakening the general validity of the 
compensation hypothesis. 
 
 
2. Econometric strategy and data 
 
In order to update the analysis by AW and R and to compare our estimates with their 
previous results, we start from the same set of parsimonious equations: 
 
  
€ 
GOVit =α + β1SIZEit + β2Yit + uit     (1) 
  
€ 
TRADEit = γ + β3SIZEit + β4Yit +εit      (2) 
  
€ 
GOVit =δ + β5TRADEit + β6Yit + vit     (3) 
 
where   
€ 
Yit  is the PPP converted per capita GDP used as a common control variable in all 
regressions (an analogous control is included in AW and R). The first equation considers the 
relation between the share of government consumption over GDP at 2005 constant prices 
(GOV) and country size (SIZE, approximated by total population). Government consumption 
excludes interest payments, transfers and public investments, while it includes the monetary 
value of in-kind publicly provided goods and services (e.g., health and education). The 
second equation introduces the relation between trade openness (TRADE), defined by the 
share of exports and imports over GDP at 2005 constant prices, and country size, while 
equation (3) gives the relation between trade openness and government consumption. It is 
worth noting that the parsimonious specification – which excludes other control variables – is 
adopted in order to make our analysis as closest as possible to both AW and R. 
In equation (1),   
€ 
β1 < 0  would suggest a lower government consumption in larger countries. 
As argued by AW, this ‘income effect’ would be driven by the lower per capita cost of the 
public good provision, that would raise the opportunities for more private consumption. Yet, 
                                                 
2 AW do not apparently take into account that Rodrik (1998) shows the persistence of the positive sign of the coefficient of 
trade openness also in alternative cases, and that the positive sign is robust to the introduction of two proxies of country size, 
i.e. land area and population. The main difference between AW and Rodrik (1998) would therefore lie in the contrasting 
outcome emerging in AW when the regression is not estimated in logs. 
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if there is a certain degree of substitutability between private and public goods, a reduction of 
the ‘price’ of public goods may lead to additional government consumption and to   
€ 
β1 > 0 . In 
equation (2),   
€ 
β3 < 0  would rationalise the intuition that smaller countries, in a regime of trade 
liberalisation, are not necessarily associated to smaller markets, as the political borders do not 
identify the size of the market (AW; 306); larger countries, instead, have more opportunities 
for ‘autarky’. Equation (3), instead, gives a simplified picture of the Rodrik’s (1998) position. 
In this case,   
€ 
β5 > 0  would support the compensation hypothesis, i.e. the case where more 
exposure to international trade would lead to a higher government consumption, while  
would support the efficiency hypothesis, i.e. the case where economic openness introduces a 
constraint to public spending. 
In what follows, under appropriate specifications of the previous set of equations and 
using similar econometric techniques, we will be able to replicate most of the results obtained 
by AW and R, but also to provide some additional insights. In particular, we will first show 
that the relationship between government size and openness is not necessarily mediated by 
country size. Second, that those outcomes strongly depend on the presence of a specific 
geographical area and cannot thus easily be generalised. 
Data used in the analysis are mainly taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
and from the Penn World Tables (PWT). The unbalanced panel needed to compare our 
results with AW and R, consists of a maximum of 156 countries variously observed between 
1962 and 2009, which also make the results comparable with more recent contributions on 
the topic (e.g., Kimakova, 2009).3 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Similarities and differences with AW and R 
 
AW show that the compensation hypothesis is confirmed only when population is not 
included among the regressors (as originally formulated by Rodrik, 1998). When equation (3) 
is augmented with population and variables are entered in levels, the positive relationship 
between openness and government consumption disappears. As stated by AW (p. 318), this 
would imply that “... the effect of openness on government size is largely driven by the 
omission of country size ...”. This result, however, has been attributed by R to the lack of 
cross-country heterogeneity in the pooled OLS regression performed by AW. By introducing 
a fixed effect estimator, R shows that the positive relationship comes back even after 
controlling for population size, restoring the validity of the compensation hypothesis. 
The first panel of table 1 reports our estimations by OLS and fixed effects of equations (1) 
to (3). All variables are expressed in logs (if not otherwise stated), while the significance 
level is calculated using the White’s (1980) heteroskedastic standard errors. Consider first 
equation (1) (the relationship between government size and population) as reported in 
columns A and B. OLS on pooled data are consistent with the corresponding outcomes in 
both AW and R (whose signs and statistical significance are reported in rows Population in 
AW and Population in R), suggesting that a lower government consumption is associated to 
larger countries. Moving to fixed effects (henceforth FE) gives in R a positive and 
                                                 
3 The nature of the panel (unbalanced) means that not all countries are observed in all years.Even though it is not explicitly 
stated, unbalancing must occur also in R, where the product between the number of countries declared (154) and the years 
observed (41) should provide 6,314 observations. However, in tables only 5,117 observations are reported, which means 
about 81 per cent of the potential total number of observations. In our case, after extending to 2009, this percentage is quite 
similar (81.6 per cent). The distribution of countries across years in R is however not known. Thus, it is not possible to check 
whether our countries are a perfect subset of the original 154 in R. 
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statistically significant coefficient (AW does not perform FE), which contradicts the 
relationship between the two variables identified by pooled OLS. In our estimates, instead, 
the coefficient is of the same size sign as in pooled OLS, and still statistically significant.4 
With regard to equation (2) (the relationship between trade openness and population), the 
maintained hypothesis is that larger countries are less open (columns C and D). Our 
estimations with OLS are again in line with this intuition (the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant) and in line with the results by AW and R. The same outcome as in R 
is also obtained when using FE (a coefficient that is not statistically significant). 
Consider now equation (3) (the relationship between government size and trade openness) 
when population is not included among the control variables (column E). OLS estimates give 
an outcome that is consistent with AW, and would still be consistent with the possibility that 
the compensation hypothesis may be driven by the omission of country size. When including 
country size (columns G), AW shows that the compensation hypothesis is true when ratios 
are entered in logs, while it is not true when ratios are entered in levels. Our OLS estimates, 
instead, reveal that the compensation hypothesis could be supported in both cases. Estimation 
by fixed effects are instead both in line with R (columns F and H), which means that the 
compensation hypothesis survives the inclusion of population among the regressors. Thus, in 
our estimates, the compensation hypothesis does not seem mediated by country size in neither 
case, as suggested by R. This outcome confirms the original results by R that cross-country 
heterogeneity may best explain the presence of the compensation hypothesis and exclude the 
case that the omission of country size is a fundamental driver of it, even after extending the 
analysis to 2009. 
In order to check whether the compensation hypothesis is robust to alternative 
specifications, FE have been replicated using two transformed datasets. The first includes all 
156 countries, with variables expressed as a 5-year moving average of the original ones. The 
second is to use a 5-year average of the relevant variables for that subset of countries forming 
a balanced panel dataset (from 1979 to 2008). Both strategies have the aim of weeding out 
short-term fluctuations of the variable. A third alternative is to use lagged explanatory 
variables to deal with a potential endogeneity problem. In all cases, the coefficient of trade in 
equation (3) – in both versions – is positive and statistically significant (in one case the 
significance level is slightly above 5 per cent), an outcome that supports the compensation 
hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2. Sensitivity to geographical areas 
 
It is worth now exploring the robustness of the conclusion by R that cross-country 
heterogeneity is the best explanation to assign general validity to the compensation 
hypothesis. The reason for this geographical investigation is that the available empirical 
studies often include a large number of countries, with deep political and institutional 
differences, as well as large gaps in average incomes and the size of the public sector. Thus, a 
uniform behaviour of the relationship between government consumption and trade openness 
cannot be taken for granted. This suggests to analyse whether specific groups of countries or 
world regions may drive the compensation hypothesis.  
The second panel of table 1 shows that this is the case. In particular, the presence of the 
compensation hypothesis seems to be driven by the presence of African countries. The most 
                                                 
4 The difference identified by R is hardly explainable, especially if one takes into account that all other results in our 
estimations are strongly similar to R. Even though the two regressions have different temporal extensions, a replication of 
the regression from 1962 to 2000 (which is the upper limit also used in Ram, 2009) gives the same sign (negative instead of 
positive as in R), with no apparent deviation (not reported in table). 
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striking result is that while the first two relationships are not affected (columns A to D), the 
core relationship between government size and trade openness undergoes a fundamental 
change. Indeed, while estimations with pooled OLS (columns E and G) are fully comparable 
to the previous ones even after excluding African countries, estimations with FE (columns F 
and H) are no longer sufficient to guarantee the generalised persistence of the compensation 
hypothesis. Indeed, with or without population, the coefficient of trade openness is not 
statistically significant. This also holds for alternative specifications with 5-year moving 
average, 5-year averages (where 19 African countries are removed from the balanced panel) 
and lagged explanatory variables. This means that the positive and significant effect found by 
R and replicated by our estimates in the case of all countries is not driven by a generalised 
cross-country heterogeneity, but only by the cross-country heterogeneity of African countries 
compared to the rest of the world. 
In order to check for the robustness of this result, FE are replicated by excluding other 
continents one at a time. The outcome is reported in columns F and H at the bottom of the 
table. One can see that all coefficients are statistically significant. This implies that the 
inclusion of African countries is a sufficient condition to generate the validity of the 
compensation hypothesis, while its exclusion denies its general validity. 
To some extent, the power of African countries as a driver of the compensation hypothesis 
is not very surprising if one considers the year in which uninterrupted trade openness began 
in many countries of the continent. According to the most recent data provided by Wacziarg 
and Horn Welch (2008), 8 out of 47 African countries included in the analysis are still 
classified as “closed” to international trade,5 and other seven countries date their trade 
openness just after 1995.6 Thus, almost 1/3 of African countries have been “closed” for most 
of the time they are observed in the dataset; furthermore, on a total of 44 countries (out of 91 
surveyed by Wacziarg and Horn Welch, 2008) that opened to trade after 1991, 25 in total are 
African countries. These numbers cast some doubts on how these countries could be 
confidently used to support the compensation hypothesis in the absence of the institutional 
conditions in which this hypothesis should work (i.e. formal openness). In our view, the 
relationship between government size and trade openness cannot safely be assumed to behave 
in Africa as in other geographical areas where formal trade openness is more developed, and 
should merit a separate treatment. 
This outcome is particularly important, if matched with the perception that econometric 
analyses with a larger number of countries are more often in favour of the compensation 
hypothesis (Gastaldi and Liberati, 2011). Generalisations of this outcome should therefore be 
assessed with extreme caution in the light of the present results. We have shown that country 
size is to some extent irrelevant to determine the sign of the relationship; while cross-country 
heterogeneity only picks some specific characteristics of the African countries, that of being 
relatively more closed and therefore unsuitable to defend the compensation hypothesis. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided additional insights to understand the relationship between 
government size and economic openness. On the one hand, it is shown that country size is not 
relevant to determine the sign of the relationship between government size and economic 
                                                 
5 They are: Central African Republic; Lesotho; Liberia; Nigeria; Togo; Gabon; Algeria; Congo; Malawi; Senegal; 
Swaziland. Note that the total number of closed countries is 29. 
6 They are: Egypt; Ethiopia; Madagascar; Mozambique; Tanzania; Mauritania; Sierra Leone. 
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openness, contradicting previous results by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). On the other hand, 
the relevance of the cross-country heterogeneity suggested by Ram (2009) to argue in favour 
of the compensation hypothesis only picks some specific characteristics of the African 
countries, especially that of being relatively more closed. As a consequence, the 
compensation hypothesis cannot be assigned general validity on this ground. This result is 
also robust to alternative specifications of the explanatory variables. 
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Table 1 – Pooled and fixed effects: a comparison with AW and R 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaborations on PWT, WDI and UNCTAD data 
 
